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TAKING STOCK OF TAKINGS: AN AUTHOR'S
RETROSPECTIVE

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

I. TAKINGS A GENERATION LATER

It is my very great pleasure to write a short response to these presentations given
at the conference held in connection with the decision of the faculty of the William &
Mary School of Law to designate me as the recipient of the second Brigham-Kanner

prize. I am especially grateful that the prize was awarded for my book Takings,' which
seems after twenty years to have weathered at least some of the scathing criticisms sent
in its direction on the occasion of its publication.2 Before commenting briefly on the
three papers in this symposium, let me express my continued puzzlement as to why the
book has attracted such fierce criticism. The obvious reason is that my extended analysis of the Takings Clause ended with the "modest" conclusion that the vast redistributive programs of the New Deal were in fact unconstitutional if the Takings Clause was
given its proper interpretation, one that properly combined its specific language with
its larger intellectual structure.' Everyone knows that the clause itself says, "[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."4 As Eric Claeys
points out, an aggressive reading of this clause cannot be blithely dismissed as suffering from the oxymoronic features of substantive due process. 5 Clearly, the text of
the clause contains no internal contradiction. The key interpretive question asks what
weight should be given to each of its constituent terms.
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. My thanks to the
editors of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journalfor allowing me to write in response to
comments delivered on October 29, 2005, at a conference in honor of my receiving the
Brigham-Kanner award, and to Corina Wilder, University of Chicago Law School, Class of
2008, for her excellent research assistance.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
2 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The MalthusianConstitution,41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21 (1986);
Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously:An Essayfor Centrists,74 CAL. L. REV. 1829 (1986)
(reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 1); Joseph Sax, Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (1986)
(reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 1). All three scholars were in attendance at a conference on
Takings held in late 1985 at the University of San Diego Law School, whose proceedings
were later reprinted in full. Proceedingsat the Conference on Takings of Property and the
Constitution,41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 49 (1986). For more choice tidbits, see Eric R. Claeys,
Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 439-40.
3 See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 281-82.
4

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

' Claeys, supra note 2, at 441-43.
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To start with the first key term, private property is one of our most comprehensive
social institutions, so it seems odd to give it a narrow construction that bears scant
resemblance to the term "private property" as it is used in the private law. Land and
chattels are obviously part of the overall picture. And more importantly all interests in
land-leases, mortgages, life estates, reversions-are part of it as well. When John
Locke wrote that property embraced our "Lives, Liberties and Estates, 6 he gave private property a broader definition than the standard account, by including the personal
freedoms that in practice seem to be better located in the constitutional protections
for speech, contract and religion. But even if these interests are excised, the Takings
Clause still covers a lot of turf, and it is not a sensible construction of the phrase to try
to limit it to, for example, the protection of the right to exclude only when the conception from Roman times forward has always included the rights of use and disposition as well.7
So perhaps then we could narrow the meaning of the clause by putting tough
emphasis on the term "taken" which could be limited only to the outright physical
dispossession of property. But it would be odd in the extreme to hold that the state
has not taken property when it strips a mortgagee of his lien, when it denies the holder
of a future interest the right to enter his land on the termination of a life estate, when
it prohibits the holder of a patent from practicing his art, or when it requires the owner
of a trade secret to share it with the rest of the world. Clearly a sensible reading has
to accept that the meaning of the term "private property" covers liens, future interests,
and intangible forms of property. The full range of private law interests are implicated
by the clause, and any removal of rights from the standard bundle of rights-a phrase
which will be addressed more later-subjects the government action to examination
under the Takings Clause. Thus if a party lets a friend into his house for a day, and that
person refuses to leave when the invitation has expired, it is just word play to insist that
property has not been taken because the entrance was lawful even though the tenant's
holdover was not. Yet the constant effort to situate rent control statutes outside the
law of takings rests on the odd conceit that the holdover tenant has not displaced the
original owner.'
The clause's coverage, moreover, does not stop with this individual taking.
Takings makes a concerted effort to explain why in principle we can draw no sharp line
between the outright confiscation of the land of one person, and the regulation of use
or disposition by many persons.9 The argument is that each fractional interest in property counts as property. The property of two or more individuals counts as property
as well, so that regulation should be understood as consisting of many small takings
Two TREATIsEs OF GOVERNMENT [ 123, at 350 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
7 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 63-92. On the definitional question, see A.M. Honore,
Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).
8 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 176-77, 186-88.
9 Id. at 93-104.
6 JOHN LOCKE,
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from an ever-expanding number of separate individuals. The modem law of course
rejects this view, but only at a horrible price of being utterly unable to explain which
forms of regulation go "too far" and which remain on the acceptable side of the line.
There is a continuum here both with respect to the number of persons whose property
is taken and the extent of the taking from each. It may well be distressing for defenders of regulation to have to confront the argument that no form of regulation escapes
scrutiny under the Takings Clause. But at the same time the defenders of the status quo
concede the incoherence of the current system, which tries to draw a line at "all viable
economic use," without explaining why this fix makes sense, even to them. As I am
fond of saying, it takes a theory to beat a theory, and on this point there is no theory
out there which offers a unified treatment of traditional dispossessions and various
forms of state regulation.
Next, what about just compensation? The key point here is that the division of
thinking on the compensation issue parallels that on the regulation side. In cases of isolated takings the challenge is to figure out what measure of compensation is owing and
why. With widespread regulations, the key element is to understand the role of implicit
in-kind compensation, which receives so much attention in Takings.10 Let us take these
in sequence.
In evaluating the level of cash compensation for outright takings, it is critical to
revert to the central purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to see that the state does
not force special burdens on those individuals who have been forced to sacrifice their
property to advance the common good. Yet the usual formulas that tie compensation
to fair market value fall far short of that goal. Most obviously, they do not give any
credit to the greater use or subjective value of property that is not up for sale. Nor
does the formula attempt to take into account any of the dislocations that government
coercion forces on the property owner. Wearing those blinkers means that the law
excludes compensation, legal fees, appraisal fees, moving expenses, loss of good will,
and a favorable neighborhood and environment. I can still recall when I first encountered Gideon Kanner's trenchant exposition of this point in the CaliforniaWestern
Law Review, with his ruthless expos6 of the systematic shortfall under the law that is
as cogent today as when it was written thirty-six years ago. " Kanner was of course
primarily concerned with issues of text and fairness. 2 But the gaps in compensation
are not just a matter of equity, although they are surely that. The basic error in compensation also leads to a systematic overcondemnation of land by understating the losses
that the taking inflicts. The point here is not to deal with compensation solely from
the vantage point of the party whose property has been taken, but from the larger social
point of view of setting the right prices to avoid distortions in government decisions.
10 EPSTEIN, supra note 1.
" Gideon Kanner, When Is "Property"Not "PropertyItself':A CriticalExaminationof

the Bases of Denialof Compensationfor Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W. L.
REV. 57 (1969), discussed in EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 82.
2 See id. at 61.
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With respect to general regulations, it is manifestly impossible in most cases to
offer cash compensation to the thousands of individuals who are adversely impacted
by the state action. Nor is it necessary to try. The broad definition of a taking is in
many instances offset by the broad definition of compensation, which takes into
account the benefits that state action provides to the very people whom it regulates.
A zoning regulation for example hits many people at the same time. In some instances
it overcomes prisoners' dilemma games and allows them all to reach higher levels of
utility. Many sign ordinances have this effect, by keeping everyone from blocking the
views of the sign next door. In other cases, regulation is a device to cripple one competitor for the benefit of another. I see no reason why two forms of regulation should
be treated the same if there is any sensible way to distinguish between them, and happily, there is, by looking first for a disparate treatmentof the regulated parties, and next
to the disparate impactof regulation on similarly situated parties. Why defend a regime
that can zone a business parcel on one side of the road for agriculture, while the parcel
across the way is allowed to have, without competition, a shopping mall? In working
through the implications of the Takings Clause, my objective has never been to tilt
the balance of advantage one way or the other. Far from seeking to create privilege,
the purpose of a sound interpretation, then as now, is to limit its impact.
Next, there comes the question of public use. The obvious cases all include situations where the property is used by the public, where it is beyond the power of any
court to knock out foolish proposals to build unneeded highways. But a sensible use
of the conception also allows the state to take property for private use where the lands
that are adversely impacted have little value to the owner who stands in a key location
that allows him to extract a huge advantage from playing the holdout card. That is the
import with cases that allow a mine to run a tram over scrub land to reach a railroad.
Yet there is no reason because one goes this far to take the position that it is perfectly
fine to condemn private homes for some grandiose urban renewal project that is never
likely to get off the ground. Even though there will be some doubtful cases, we can
surely distinguish the two extremes, and the failure to do this in Kelo v. City of New
London 13 created a major league crisis of confidence for the Supreme Court. Liberals
rightly saw in Kelo an urban bulldozer that allows insiders to take advantage of their
political clout. On the other side, conservatives saw in Kelo, a gratuitous weakening
of the institution of private property. Once again, there is little reason to be upset with
the approach in Takings.
Thus far I have spoken only of the explicit components of the Takings Clause. The
position taken in Takings was not literalist in any sense, but recognized that the Takings
Clause, like all great constitutional commands, sets up a presumption that can be overridden in those cases in which the exercise of property rights necessarily trenches on
the rights of others. The entire discussion of the much mooted notion of the police
power-nowhere mentioned in the text-is an effort to trim the clause down to size,
without allowing the exception to become so large as to swallow the entire provision.' 4
11 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
14

See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 107-45.
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Thus stopping nuisances is one thing, but insisting that land remain vacant for the
benefit of tourism is quite another. Working the way through the justifications that
the state can use to limit the use of property does bring up some marginal cases (e.g.,
billboards), but that hardly means that the exercise is not worth undertaking. In the
private law, we distinguish between activities that can be enjoined by neighbors and
those which cannot. I see no reason why those insights cannot be used to explain the
constitutional response in analogous situations.
Using this approach does call into question much of zoning and rent control, for
example, but again the defenders of the status quo have to show why the critique of
these forms of regulation is wrong or why either of these dysfunctional institutions
should survive. I suspect, however, that the real unhappiness with Takings is the tough
line that it took to all forms of redistribution, from unemployment benefits to social
security, Medicare, and welfare. There are times when I share these doubts, as there is
much that is laudable in seeking to give a helping hand to individuals who have suffered from bad luck. But that hardly clinches the case that the state imposition of freewheeling transfer payments should be allowed. In all too many cases, the grotesque set
of cross subsidies, such as agricultural and dairy products, has produced ruinous consequences. Many of the most ambitious programs like Social Security and Medicare, are
impossible to change in midstream today, but their basic unsoundness was apparent
on day one. There is no way to control the level of utilization of services that are consumed by any one person individually when they are paid for collectively. The need
for welfare would be drastically reduced if the stronger protection of private property
and (for completeness) economic liberty were respected in the courts. And the much
feared welfare reforms of the Clinton administration have cut the welfare rolls without
any of the dislocations that its critics predicted. My sense is that the system would
work well if these programs were removed. But even if not, at least some effort to
stop programs that work redistribution haphazardly, or worse, from poor to rich, should
be curtailed. The New Deal was a peculiar mixture of market interferences and wealth
transfer payments that did more harm that good, even on the dimension by which it
chose to judge itself. In substance, its key program was all takings from A to B, without compensation. So the criticism was badly misplaced. To give a systematic exposition of where the law went wrong does not need an apology.
HI. COMMENTS ON THREE AUTHORS
Let me now turn to the three papers in this collection. Happily, as we move twenty
years down the road, the temper of the times has changed, and the comments that the
book receives today are far less harsh than those directed its way when it was first published. The entire intellectual climate that posited state regulation of markets was needed
for comprehensive economic justice is no longer accepted on faith. The intellectual
division of opinion is much more balanced, as is evident from these three papers.
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A. James Ely
I am exceedingly grateful to James Ely for pointing out what I have long, and ruefully known-namely, that there is little reason to think that the courts have adopted
my positions in whole, or even in part. 15 Although there is the odd movement in that
direction, it is strictly a case of two steps forward and one step backwards, if that. But
writing a book like Takings can never be called a failure because it is unable to reverse
the direction of judicial thinking that has lasted for over fifty years. It is quite enough
to break the intellectual monopoly that once backed up the New Deal order. The overall political and intellectual debate will be conducted, in my view, at a far higher level
precisely because political competition has replaced monolithic liberal orthodoxy. And
the impacts will be felt at all levels, because political officials and private parties now
have to think twice about whether they want to engage in the kinds of activities that
Takings condemns. Obviously, many interested parties will work to preserve the status
quo. But if one can switch the climate of opinion even a little bit, it will change the
kinds of projects that are proposed and accepted, hopefully for the better. In that
regard, I am more than happy that Professor Ely identifies this ability to help shift
the general scope of public discourse as the greatest influence of my work. 7
B. Eric Claeys
In one sense, Eric Claeys takes off where Ely and I began our essays by trying to
puzzle through the huge chorus of boos that Takings generated when it hit the market.
He stresses, as noted earlier, the unhappiness that liberal scholars had when a theoretical
book sought to question the dominant intellectual Zeitgeist in which the realist tradition
on property rights paved the way for the rise of the welfare state in which these rights
were truncated in favor of the expansive administrative process of the sort that got
going just as the older system of property rights fell into decay. 8 Nor was it easy
to ignore the circumstances that surrounded the publication of the book. The Reagan
White House had appointed Edwin Meese as Attorney General, and just before Takings
was published, there was an article in the House organ of the Heritage Foundation,
Policy Review, that mentioned me (along with Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, and
William Ball) as potential Supreme Court nominees,' 9 which was quite enough to add
distress to my many critics at the time. All this was of course a pipe dream, for, as
"5 James W. Ely, Jr., Impact of RichardA. Epstein, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 421,
422-23.
16
'7

See id. at 422-24.
Id. at 426-28.

's Claeys, supra note 2, at 439-40.
'9 Richard Vigilante, Beyond the Burger Court: FourSupreme Court Candidates Who
Could Lead a JudicialCounterrevolution,POL'Y REv., Spring 1984, at 20.
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Claeys points out, the Reaganites themselves took a much more cautious view of
judicial power than I did, and in fact, as good government officials, they were more
comfortable with the permanence and justice of regulation than this impatient outsider.2'
Claeys is, I think, more or less on the money when he traces the reception that
my views have received both in the Supreme Court and in academic rights.2 ' As to the
first, he rightly notes that Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council2 2 advanced the
proposition that a total economic wipe-out should be treated as a taking. However,
subsequent decisions made it clear that, in general, the balancing tests of Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. New York City,23 which I have criticized elsewhere,24 dominate
in all but the narrowest class of total wipe-outs.25 I only wish that he had more time
to discuss the deep intellectual confusions that the intellectual timidity in Lucas
spawned. In my view, the most regrettable features of Supreme Court jurisprudence
in this area are driven by two points. First, Justices on all sides of the intellectual
spectrum do not want to own up to the breadth of the Takings Clause, by reading it in
parity with, say, the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech. Second, they
have deep intellectual confusions about the ideal structure of property laws. If there
were ever an area that shows the doctrinal chaos that can come from "taking one case
at a time," takings law is it. Decisions are laid down without any sense as to how they
fit into a comprehensive framework. Watching their painful juxtaposition is to see
constant movement and trendy argumentation in little intellectual light.
All these defects are further illustrated by Justice Kennedy's remark in Lucas that
he has no desire to see takings law freeze around "a static body of state property law."'26
The remark is intended to convey the appearance of cautious awareness of the constant
and rich evolution of property law. But it in fact throws the baby out with the bath
water. In principle, there is much to commend about the static conception of the
common law.27 Rightly understood, it refers back to the stable set of expectations that
is needed to allow voluntary transactions to take place with a minimum of fuss and confusion. Just think of how matters would be if the concept of property was subject to
constant evolution so that the person who bought Blackacre on one day would not
know whether he could sell it on the next. The entire force of the maxim nemo dat
quod non habet-no one is allowed to convey what he does not own-is intended to

20 Claeys, supra note 2, at
21 See id. at 442-45.
22 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

440-42.

438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Richard A. Epstein, The Ebbs andFlows in Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Tahoe
Case, 2001-2002 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 5, 28-29.
25 Claeys, supra note 2, at 443.
26 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
27 Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253
(1980).
23

24
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secure the chain of title to real property so that individuals who invest on one day will
not see their holdings stripped from them on the next.
There are, of course, situations in which the evolution of property rights is needed,
but this is a process that should never be undertaken casually by a court that thinks
rights would be better configured in other ways. Rather, it is important in all cases to
show how the transformation in rights is triggered by a technological change that the
older system of property rights could not take into account. It is, therefore, sensible to
think of pooling arrangements for oil and gas that lie under multiple plots of land, or
to find ways to make the upper airspace a highway for aviation, or to allow for the free
movement of radio waves across the borders of private property. But such changes
satisfy a quite exacting set of standards. First, they all involve situations in which the
relaxation of older property rules produces huge overall gains with little or no dislocation of the economic interests of any of the affected parties. In addition, these
systems can be arranged so that virtually all persons whose property is taken receive
in exchange a set of benefits that are equal to or, in practice, far greater than those
which they surrendered, so that wholly without cash side payments they are left better
off than before. Such was the reason I spent so much time dealing with the problem
of implicit-in-kind compensation in Takings.2 8
The real question is how this particular insight applied to the regulation in Lucas,
which told landowners that they could not build on their property at all given the risks
of its destruction by hurricanes and land movements.29 On this point, there is simply
no reason why the traditional ownership rules did not apply to this situation. South
Carolina could make no credible claim that building ordinary homes created a nuisance
to other parties. The risk of destruction, which is quite real in these cases, should lie
with the owners when the main function of the state is not to supply the subsidized
insurance that encourages foolhardy adventures that turn sour. But the lesson to be
taken from all of this is not that the state should be able to stop construction dead in
its tracks, but that it should remove the subsidies that force others to pay for whatever construction a landowner makes along dangerous, but desirable, coastal regions.
On this point, the last things we need are evolving rules. What is needed is a clear recognition that owners take the risk of destruction of their own property as the cost of
getting the benefit from its use. The complex issues of coordinated networks and
common-pools, issues that drive the airspace, telecommunications, and oil and gas
industries, are nowhere to be seen. What is now needed is not a retreat from Lucas but
a clear sense that it applies to all lesser schemes by the state that use an excess of legal
process to starve and choke off development for the benefit of neighbors, an issue
raised to an art form by the Supreme Court in its misconceived decision in Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank.3 °
28 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 195-215.
29 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
30 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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I also think that Claeys is on the money in thinking that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is in fact the natural home by which the
Takings Clause is made applicable to the states.3 Correcting the sins of the SlaughterHouse Cases3 2 decision only took place by forcing these guarantees through the Due
Process Clause, which led to the constant fight over the appropriate nature of this
oxymoron. I do not think that we should transform the name "Takings" to
"Abridgements" 33 because even though partial takings are abridgments of property
rights, there are lots of areas in which the abridgments involved, are not takings claims.
The important point to note here, however, is that the later amendments tend to speak
in terms of "deny or abridge" as if they lack confidence that the limited notion of
abridgment also embraces a total denial. But no one should want to read the First
Amendment to allow the total abrogation of all speech because denials are the end point
of a continuum that covers all abridgments. Takings run parallel argument in the opposite direction. There is no sensible case, with or without incorporation, to let it cover
total deprivation of rights, ignoring all lesser incursions thereon. In both cases, the
scope question is resolved in favor of broad judicial review, so that the battle takes
place on the three frontiers of police power, public use, and just compensation.
At this point, Claeys shifts gear into high theoretical mode, and uses takings to
attack the view that property is nothing more than an arbitrary assemblage of rights
into a bundle of rights.34 He has somewhat more distaste for that phrase than I do, but
his substantive point is right, whether one embraces the bundle of rights metaphor or
not. Thus the view that I defended in Takings stressed that there were certain incidents
of ownership, possession, use, and disposition that fit together closely and functionally
so that it is not possible to give one attribute, such as the right to exclude others (which
need not include the owner's right to enter), priority over all the others. The explanation for this unity is that it avoids the endless wrangling that would occur if rights
of possession were assigned to one person, use to a second, and disposition to a third.
And it avoids the senseless social waste that might occur should someone decide to
allocate possession, but deny that the rights of either use or disposition are part of the
title to the land belonging to the first occupier. The point is that the unity of ownership is a coherent assembly of rights so that anyone who wishes to break it down has
to explain why he is justified in doing so, and what compensation he will supply for
disrupting that body of rights.
Although this need not be the case, the modem use of the bundle of rights is meant
to suggest that you can "add a stick, remove a stick" at will, and it does not matter for
"1Claeys, supra note 2, at 443-47; accordRichard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons:
Reconstructingthe Privilegesor Immunities Clause ofthe FourteenthAmendment, I N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 334, 340-46 (2005).
32

13
14

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
See Claeys, supra note 2, at 446.
Id. at 447-53.
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constitutional purposes. I think that larger political forces than the bundle of rights
language were at work here. But whether Claeys is right to give the phrase causal
efficacy is a second-order issue. 35 The key point is that the newer attitude toward property, championed by such writers as Robert L. Hale and Arthur R. Corbin, gives the
state an unquestioned power to reconfigure or redefine property at will, so that no
owner of land can be upset if the right to build over ten stories or lease the premises to
pickle vendors is abridged.36 As Claeys rightly notes, start down this path and you have
not left it up to the administrative state to decide what rights belong in what bundles
before you get to the question of constitutional protection.3 7 It is no accident that
Claeys singles out Bruce Ackerman's PrivatePropertyand the Constitutionfor raising
this erroneous view of the world into a scientific truth. 38 As I argued when the book
came out, it is just a deep misconception of how property rights function that invites
the instability that is the hallmark of modem land use law.39
The upshot is that we no longer protect Lockean rights (which in truth imitate the
Roman law conception) but whatever odd constellation of rights survive interest-group
politics. If I am right that the compact or unitary bundles of ordinary ownership lead
to the efficient allocation of resources, then you can make a knock-out claim against the
current system. It spends a fortune to fractionate property rights in an inefficient fashion. This is indeed no idle pipe dream--the first major zoning case, Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.,4° did this when it took a perfectly serviceable 68-acre lot and divided it into three separate zones, knocking down overall value by somewhere between
seventy-five and eighty percent.4' Indeed, Claeys is right to note that the entire Progressive movement (with Woodrow Wilson again over-claiming for the administrative
state) started the ball rolling, setting the ground up for the rise of legal realism which
led to what Thomas Grey eventually termed the disintegration of property rights.42
See id. at 450.
36 See id. (discussing Arthur R. Corbin, Taxation ofSeats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE
"

L.J. 429,429 (1922); Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the PropertyConcept,

22 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 214 (1992)).
37 Id. at 451.
38 See id. at 450-51 (discussing BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTrrUTION 26 (1977)).
3' AcKEP MAN, supra note 38, at 26. For my review that takes Ackerman to task for privileging the so-called scientific view from the vulgar lay view, see Richard A. Epstein, The
Next GenerationofLegal Scholarship?,30 STAN. L. REv. 635 (1978) (reviewing ACKERMAN,
supra note 38).
40 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

"' For discussion of its fate, see ROBERT C. ELuIcKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 76-92 (3d ed. 2005); for my comments, see Richard A.
Epstein, A ConceptualApproach to Zoning: What's Wrong With Euclid, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 277 (1996).

42 See Claeys, supranote 2, at 451 (citing Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property,

in NOMOS XXII:

PROPERTY

69, 81 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980)).
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After his truly splendid account of the transformation of property rights thinking
in the United States, Claeys addresses the key point of difference between us, which is
one of style and argumentation, and less of results.43 Claeys sees the basic driver of
property protection as the natural law tradition which gave pride of place to private
property institutions." I am respectful of that tradition, as he notes, but I tend to think
that its utilitarian side was more important in the evolution of this doctrine than does
Claeys.45 The point is subject to immense difficulty because much of the modem economic jargon that allows for a coherent articulation of the economic position was not
available in the formative years of natural law. It is hard to talk about property rights
in water, for example, if one does not know the importance of marginal benefits and
marginal costs. And it is hard to understand the role of just compensation if there is
no linkage between that conception and the standard economic definitions of efficiency
that derive from conceptions of Pareto optimality and superiority. But on balance, I
think that understanding these variables gives us a greater appreciation as to why the
law has assumed its current form, and a keener sense of where and how changes in the
legal order can take place.
Claeys notes that my sunny optimism and good understanding of utilitarian principles (in my case of the Paretian and not aggregate sort) lead to a sensible justification
of most traditional rules, which has been subject to trenchant (but friendly) criticism by
small government thinkers in the libertarian school.' In general, I believe the overtly
functional approach does a much better job in dealing with water rights, oil and gas,
spectrum, and overflight than the natural law theory, which cannot show timeless
devotion to rights in resources, many of which were unknown (or like water, not found
in western rivers running through deep gorges) in England during the formative
common law period. Claeys's other criticism, which postulates that slavery is not inconsistent with utilitarianism, 47 strikes me as simply wrong given the fact that we see
no consensual movement toward slavery in comparison to employment or even apprentice regulations. The anti-slavery case had better be easy for all approaches to property
rights, and it is in my view as well as his.
It is important not to overstate differences. In particular, there is no question
that Claeys is correct to see the consequentialist handwriting behind much of the
See Claeys, supra note 2, at 453-55.
44 See id. at 453.
41 See id.
46 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, The Uncertain Relationship
Between Libertarianismand Utilitarianism,19 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 657, 657 (2000); Eric
Mack, Comment: A Costly Road to NaturalLaw, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 753 (1989).
Naturally, I could not allow these challenges to pass by in silence. For my answer to Eric
Mack, see Richard A. Epstein, Postscript:Subjective Utilitarianism,12 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 769 (1989). This was a postscript to my principal paper, Richard A. Epstein, The
UtilitarianFoundations of Natural Law, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 713 (1989). My
response to Alexander and Schwarzschild is found in Richard A. Epstein, The Uneasy
Marriageof Utilitarianand LibertarianThought, 19 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 783 (2000).
47 See Claeys, supra note 2, at 453-55.
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earlier natural law language,48 so that the operational differences between the two
views are often hard to make out. And where natural law theory slips into mindless
Kantian dogmatism, as it does with the proposition that no one is allowed to lie in selfdefense or to save his children from slaughter, few if any sane natural law thinkers
will take the bait. Here, I think the real answer is, "in for a dime, in for a dollar." If
you let the consequentialist arguments into the picture, it becomes a distraction to mix
and match two theories, while never being sure of the weight of either in any given
case. I have no question that natural law views are what guide ordinary individuals
in making particular decisions, and they are right to do so. The process of justification
has to be consistent with these instincts, or explain why long-standing rules make little
or no sense. But it does not discredit the theory to place it on firmer theoretical
footings. The simple question from the Paretian is this: Is there any reason on natural
law grounds to accept a distribution of rights that is Pareto inferior? If not, we are not
all Keynesians, but rather consequentialists, perhaps in spite of ourselves. As Claeys
and I both know, ours is a dispute between friends who are in essential agreement over
all that matters.
C. Eduardo Pefialver
Last, I turn to the fine contribution of Eduardo M. Pefialver, 49 who clearly has
major misgivings with my overall project, especially as it pertains to welfare rights.
Here it should be evident that the stakes are higher than in the differences between
Claeys and myself. Whatever our substantive disagreements, however, I am, of course,
grateful to Pefialver for his kind words, and am confident that he will go on to a distinguished career in the law. As one grows more senior in the profession, it becomes
ever more apparent that we pay our debt to our own teachers by trying to help, in whatever way we can, the next generation of scholars and students. And in one sense, the
highest praise is to take seriously younger scholars when they chase after you.
Pefialver is correct, I think, in noting that my academic career has taken this odd
transformation.5 ° I started off as a libertarian thinker who worked loosely within the
natural rights tradition, and tended to have a strong sense of absolute rights. In part,
I might add, this was because of the nature of the problems that I tended to work on
in my early academic years, which were largely concerned with two-party or smallnumber relationships: buyer and seller, with perhaps an assignee or a third-party
beneficiary; injurer and victim, with perhaps an intervening actor. For those situations,
the strong libertarian view of property rights, which are protected against aggression
and subject to voluntary exchange, works wonders and helps explain huge portions of
our daily interactions. There is no other theory that helps us understand marriage,
48

See id. at 454-55.

See Eduardo M. Pefialver, Reconstructing Richard Epstein, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 429 (2006).
49

50 id.
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charity and business as well as this one, and we would be loath to reject it in its entirety
because of counterexamples.
Yet at the same time, as the set of issues that dominated my thought, and that of
the profession of which I am a part, started to shift, the theories had to shift with it.
Dealing with questions of network industries, common-pool resources, or general taxation showed the inadequacy of pure libertarian models to explain the origins of the
state on the one hand, and the sensible use of taxation and regulation on the other.
Takings was, in part, an effort to show how forced exchanges required profound modifications in Robert Nozick' s hard-line libertarian theories, which exerted much influence
on my intellectual development. 5' As Pefialver points out, I do not embrace the unflinching egoistic view of personality associated with Thomas Hobbes,52 but prefer
the slightly softer version of self-interest tempered with "confin'd generosity," which
was the staple of David Hume.5 3
The gist of Pefialver's criticism is that any retreat from the purity of the strong
libertarian model requires us to fall into the "deadly embrace of the [social] welfare
state," where entitlements are granted only to be revised by collective political action.-4
I think that there are two rejoinders to this notion. First, the entire discussion of
implicit-in-kind compensation above is an effort to do just that-to allow for the state
to create across-the-board improvements without getting into the business of using the
state to facilitate the parochial goals of various factions. In addition, it relies on the
various impulses of community to create "imperfect obligations" of voluntary assistance
to the less fortunate, which could, but need not, include the partial forgiveness of loans,
or allowing the gleanings of the crop to be harvested by others.55 One reason to back
off state coercion in the welfare business, in my opinion, is because it crowds out the
more nuanced responses that arise when individuals make these choices through voluntary associations that are better able to match the assistance provided to the individuals
who receive it. The great danger here is that the use of political systems to run transfers
in either cash or kind crowds out the private arrangements so that we spend more and
get less. The rapid decline in free or low-cost medical services by private physicians,
which was a tradition in the 1940s and 1950s, was driven out in large measure by
Medicare and Medicaid programs. I do not think that the larger welfare state requires
51 EPSTEIN, supra note
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52 See generally Ron Replogle, Personality and Society in Hobbes's Leviathan, 19
POLITY 570 (1987).
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a break down of these voluntary assistance programs for the poor. We can still have
churches and friendly societies with local missions. And when push comes to shove,
these same groups are a lot faster on the uptake than FEMA when it comes to getting
aid to the victims of Hurricane Katrina-where the major function of government
seemed to be to block the movement of charitable assistance under its own elaborate
permitting process.
Pefialver is quite correct to observe that my objections to transfer payments rest as
much on the empirical reality as to what they accomplish as on the formal tension between them and the Takings Clause. 6 Nonetheless, I disagree strongly with Pefialver
that in practice the logic of my argument on forced exchanges pushes us in the direction
of the welfare state to get all the downtrodden in the state of nature to sign on.57 Even
without a welfare system, they gain enormously from the protection of the political
order. Their great peril does not lie in the absence of welfare, but in the imposition of
barriers to entry into labor markets by minimum wage and antidiscrimination laws, and
real estate markets by zoning and similar restraints. One key message of Takings is
methodological: every time one sees a social problem, think of a regulation that could
be removed rather than looking for another subsidy to be added. The former opens up
markets, increases wealth, and reduces factional power. The latter closes markets, reduces wealth, and facilitates factional intrigue. There is no state of nature theory, nor
any sound view of forced exchanges, that pushes us down so unwise a social path. In
my own view, Amartya Sen's highly touted theory of capabilities to which Pefialver
refers" is not a solution, but is, in fact, the problem. Sen's theory treats these differences in wealth as insuperable save by government education that limits the options;
a minimum wage surely does for the very individuals whom it wants to help. Our goal
is to get the political system to support competition, not transfer payments, as Pefialver
wrongly supposes.59
CONCLUSION

I think that there is little need to repeat or summarize the arguments that I have
raised in this brief response. But I will end on this note. The issues of private property
and the Takings Clause, which I weighed in on over twenty years ago, are very much
part of the mainstream legal landscape today, which I regard as a good feature no
matter what the outcome of the debate. It is presumptuous for anyone to think that
one book or even one career can shift mainstream understandings over an institution
as important and complex as private property rights. But, gee, is it ever fun to try.
Pefialver, supra note 49, at 434-36.
I' at 434.
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58 Id. at 433; see also AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES AND DEVELOPMENT 336-37
(1984).
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